Introduction
The conflict between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leonean government represents a highly instructive study for reintegration projects, primarily due to the motives underpinning violence and the identity of the main protagonists. Far from being a conventional political insurgency readily lending itself to peaceful political transformation, the RUF possessed within the ranks of its young and brutalised recruits a fundamental rejection of Sierra Leone's political structures. As such, Sierra Leone presented a unique challenge for reintegration efforts, requiring not only the immediate reconciliation of ex-combatants with victims and civil society, but also the long-term political incorporation of a group of youths defined by their very disengagement from and distrust of the political system.
The conflict began in early 1991 when a small group of combatants crossed the Liberian border into eastern Sierra Leone, seeking to topple the one-party regime of Joseph Momoh. 1 Met by a weak and ineffective counterinsurgency, a decade of brutal conflict ensued in which two thirds of the demobilisation and disarmament programmes, Sierra Leone remains in a state of abject poverty, with high levels of youth unemployment and limited opportunities serving to undermine the reintegration of ex-combatants. Former RUF fighters make up a significant portion of those struggling to find work, with many expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of prospects and cynicism with regard to the ruling authorities in Freetown -factors which proved instrumental to the original onset of conflict. Success in politically reintegrating ex-combatants should not, therefore, be judged solely by the absence of renewed violence or the conduct of free and fair elections. Rather, it must also appreciate the extent to which ex-combatants hold faith in the political system, and peace generally, to deliver solutions to problems of social and economic disparity or decline, and the extent to which ex-combatants themselves are shaping this process.
In this light, this article argues that despite progress in many key areas, former fighters of the RUF have yet to be fully politically reintegrated. The Sierra Leone experience demonstrates that successful political integration does not simply amount to political participation per se, but rather requires specific forms of political participation which reinforce the primacy of peaceful political interaction over and above other means for affecting change.
The RUF: 'not so much a movement as an environment'
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To assess the political reintegration of the RUF, it is first necessary to understand that the rebel group was not by nature overtly 'political' in the conventional sense. The RUF differed from many non-state armed groups in that it lacked widespread popular support or a coherent overall political and military strategy. 4 Rather than appeal to the civilian population for logistical support or to establish a political constituency, the RUF's relation to the people was characterised by brutal atrocities which often rendered it deeply unpopular, both domestically and internationally. 5 With much of its rank-and-file membership comprised of child soldiers, many of whom had been forcibly recruited, the RUF represented a largely illiterate, politically and socially dislocated body of brutalised youths, who despite possessing a myriad of legitimate grievances, were ill-equipped to return (or be introduced) to civil society and channel these grievances through peaceful political discourse.
The motivation of combatants also related to physical security and social empowerment -the capacity to exact revenge on those deemed responsible for peacetime inequalities and the status and camaraderie shared among fellow fighters. 10 In this sense, the RUF was far less a political movement with a definite goal as it was an environment facilitating modes of behaviour perceived as beneficial by combatants. Even so, many rebel fighters enjoined conflict not through some cost-benefit analysis but through direct abduction into RUF ranks. For many such fighters, the effects of brutalisation rather than the lure of loot defined their relationship to violence, yet as such, their motives were far removed from an overarching political ideology. This is not to suggest that combatants were without genuine political grievance or conviction. Indeed, the disillusionment with ruling elites was itself a factor in determining the RUF's apolitical nature: it did not represent a political alternative but an alternative to politics altogether. Violence was often manifested as a war against authority and as a total rejection of traditional hierarchies, with many combatants expressing a desire to punish Sierra Leonean society or to bring it to ruin. RUF activity displayed a clear determination to postpone political resolution and, accordingly, the language of democratic elections and peace prompted spates of violence clearly intended to deter potential voters and punish those pushing for political reconciliation.
The implications for political integration
The nature of the RUF has rendered its political reintegration far more complex than that of an armed group defined by a readily identifiable political agenda. In seeking through conflict a resolution to problems of economic and social disparity, and in finding in violence a means by which to achieve empowerment or a degree of basic welfare security, many RUF combatants were far less concerned with political concessions or governmental reform. Rather than formalising the RUF's political legitimacy, political reintegration would involve building a trust among combatants in political interaction over and above violence as a means to secure their basic welfare needs and address problems of corruption and economic underdevelopment.
However, for those who had more to lose in peace than in conflict, political incorporation represented at best a useful façade for the continuation of abuses, and at worst a direct threat to their status and position. Included in this group were the commanders and leaders for whom conflict had secured wealth from looting, diamond mining, illicit trade and the availability of cheap labour in the form of loyal fighters. Through their involvement in atrocities, many commanders also feared prosecution and peacetime reprisals, reinforcing their reluctance to renounce violence for reconciliatory discourse. As such, the RUF leadership was in many respects an obstructionist presence at peace negotiations, with commanders across the movement actively deterring rank-and-file combatants from entering DDR programmes, taking on the role of the proverbial 'spoiler'.
If the RUF leadership was uncommitted to political reintegration, the group's rank-and-file were ill-equipped for political reintegration. For those who spent many years in the RUF, particularly those abducted at a young age or recruited at the inception of the conflict, the divorce from society was so complete as to require political induction rather than reintegration. For such fighters, the norms and codes of civil society, the historical context of the conflict and the very notion of political interaction simply lay beyond their sphere of experience. Combatants commonly shared an entrenched fear and hostility towards civilian society, which in combination with a lack of basic education and high levels of illiteracy, served to obstruct their engagement in public debate and formal political participation.
Ending the Conflict: 'Spoilers' and the Spoils of Peace
The above complexities are highlighted by the successive attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the Sierra Leone conflict. These attempts also illustrate the general principle that political reintegration efforts are often ineffective if they are not grounded in an understanding of the unique context and nature of the non-state armed group at hand. Initial peace agreements failed to understand the nature of the rebel movement, the motivations of its leadership and the concerns of combatants -they treated the RUF as a conventional political insurgent group and sought to establish political reconciliation with the higher echelons of its leadership. These peace agreements were derailed by a lack of real commitment by RUF leaders, who continued to seek the perpetuation of conflict, preferring the spoils of war to those of peace.
The Abidjan Accord
The Abidjan Accord of November 1996 represented the first major breakthrough in bringing the RUF to the negotiating table and establishing an agreed platform for peace. Following electionsa product of internal pressure from civil society groups, who had the support of the international community -the military regime of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was replaced by the civilian government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). Kabbah promised amnesty to the RUF on condition that it sought terms of peace, threatening military action should the rebels fail to comply. Revealingly, it was the latter factor which proved most significant in bringing the RUF to the negotiating table, following as it did a series of military setbacks at the hands of the increasingly effective Civil Defence Forces (CDF), acting in conjunction with private security firm Executive Outcomes. Having failed to prevent elections through the violent intimidation of the electorate and last-minute negotiations with the NPRC, the RUF now saw peace talks as a means to halt the progress of the CDF and to expel Executive Outcomes from the military equation.
11
The Abidjan Accord provided clear incentives and provisions for the political reintegration of the RUF into the democratic process, including the establishment of an international trust fund to finance the RUF's transformation into a political party. However, reflecting perhaps the RUF's weakened military position, Kabbah's government did not offer the RUF any leadership posts, either in central or local government. Rather than politically incorporating the RUF into the existing regime where it could share power, the government sought to incorporate it into the democratic system where it would have to contend for power. Such democratic competition did not favour the RUF, which lacked broad political support as well as allies on the international scene. The Accord therefore failed on two key fronts. First, it offered the RUF leadership no real incentives for peace. While the invitation to form a political party held little appeal for those motivated less by political ideology as by the pursuit of status and economic wealth, the RUF's lack of support made the prospect of a democratic contest all the more unattractive. Furthermore, despite assurances of amnesties, RUF commanders remained convinced that some form of retaliation would occur once they take their place among a hostile civilian population.
Second, the accord failed to appreciate the relationship between the RUF leadership, who on the most part profited from conflict, and its rank-and-file members, who gained less economic advantage and were generally more willing to seek peace should it provide welfare and security.
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The provision to establish a RUF party mistakenly treated the rebel leadership as politically representative of combatants, risking a consolidation rather than a weakening of their hold over fighters. In this context, the arrest of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria in March 1997 did appear to offer a real window of opportunity to prise young rebels away from their jungle enclaves; reports at the time confirmed that many combatants felt confusion and ambiguity over their leadership and were demoralised by diminishing supplies and increasing desertion.
Nevertheless, simply decapitating the organisation proved insufficient, as other senior RUF leaders, also with a vested interest in conflict, were quick to fill the vacuum created by Sankoh's arrest. Under Sam Brockerie, who emerged to replace Sanko as RUF leader, illicit trade and diamond-mining operations actually increased. 13 Furthermore, commanders across the RUF actively misled combatants as to the precise details of the Abidjan agreement: rank-and-file RUF
were not informed of the crucial offer of immunity from prosecution nor of the benefits promised by the DDR programme. 14 Rather, commanders played on the common belief that the government sought to prosecute RUF combatants for their war-crimes. This misperception was reinforced by the failure of Kabbah's government to reign in the CDF, leading to violent clashes that undermined the trust and security required for DDR and signalled the collapse of the accord.
The Lomé P eace Agreement involve more than the satisfaction of a particular grievance against the state. Offering the RUF an opportunity to compete for the vote of an electorate against which it had committed a decade of atrocities was also insufficient for winning its commitment to the peace process. Instead, the incentives that truly held value for combatants were the promise of security (or conversely the threat of physical defeat), the offer of amnesty, the provision of employment and basic social and economic welfare -ends previously achieved through violence. 23 Second, the political integration of the RUF also required the dismantling of the rebel leadership, whereby rank-and-file combatants could be prised apart from the negative influence of RUF commanders. By negotiating exclusively with RUF leaders, arranging for the creation of a RUF party and attempting to incorporate the RUF in a power-sharing agreement, previous peace agreements had actually threatened to empower and legitimise those very individuals perpetuating the political disengagement of combatants. In the end, effective military power was required to eliminate the RUF's spoiler leadership, allowing for a genuine attempt at political reintegration and peace.
Third, the successful implementation of DDR hinged on the provision of a secure environment once negotiations were initiated. In Sierra Leone's case, the security required for DDR was heavily dependent on external actors, a factor that, as will become clear, has complicated the task of political reintegration in the long term.
The Failure of the RUF Party
In line with the experiences of other peace processes, it was perhaps inevitable that some attempt would be made to transform the RUF into a viable political entity, as opposed to dismantling the organisation entirely. This move was intended to aid political integration in a number of ways.
First, it would act as a visible sign of political acceptance and incorporation, whereby demobilising fighters were assured of their stake in a new and more inclusive political landscape.
Second, it could help to incorporate remnants of the RUF leadership, which might prove disruptive to continued efforts at reconciliation and reintegration if not brought into the political fold. Third, and perhaps of greatest importance to long-term peace, the creation of a political RUF party would provide ex-combatants with a conduit for political expression and an alternative The attempt to transform the RUF into a political party not only misunderstood the technical capacity of the movement but, crucially, also its nature and the motives of its young membership.
Throughout the conflict, RUF combatants had primarily been concerned with basic needs as opposed to political ideology. According to the 2003 survey, RUF combatants remained focussed upon "access to security, food, and education -and not on the political agenda of the movement". 27 Combatants' reasons for participating in the conflict were predominantly related to these priorities, with many fighters looking to gain personal security and economic advantage by joining the rebel group, as opposed to looking to the RUF to pursue a set of political goals. In the context of peace therefore, the RUF became redundant to many ex-combatants. Yet not only did ex-combatants often lack political motive; many had originally exercised little choice in joining the RUF. Eighty-seven percent of RUF respondents to the 2003 survey confirmed they had been abducted into the faction, with only 9% stating that they joined in sympathy with the movement's political aims. 28 With such a high rate of forced conscription, many ex-RUF combatants also viewed themselves as victims of the conflict, and as such did not see the RUF as the natural champion of their concerns in the post-conflict environment. 29 The RUFP was also unfeasible due to the immediate post-conflict attitude of demobilised combatants. For many former RUF combatants, the end of the conflict marked a new start, with their hopes for an improvement in living conditions strengthened by a significant international presence and the extensive flow of aid. Looking to integrate into Sierra Leone's communities, former RUF fighters had to navigate a delicate reconciliation process, living side-by-side with victims of atrocities and within a population where the rebel group was deeply unpopular. In such circumstances, there was an understandable inclination for ex-combatants to distance themselves from the RUF, with some bypassing the official DDR process altogether so as to avoid the social stigma of being labelled a former rebel. 30 Ex-combatants wishing to play down their former RUF credentials were particularly unlikely to support the hard-line RUF leaders that were gaining influence in the absence of Foday Sankoh, himself indicted for war crimes. 31 These leaders were not perceived by combatants as representative of their political concerns, but as corrupt, gaining considerable economic benefits which contrasted starkly with the situation of the rank and file and -particularly in the run-up to elections in 2002 -as obstructing the demobilisation and reintegration programme. 32 Internal leadership disputes and bitter in-fighting further served to undermine support, ensuring that ex-RUF fighters sought other avenues for political expression, ultimately condemning the RUFP to electoral failure.
It is arguable that the creation of the RUFP was undertaken for political expediency in the full knowledge that its prospects were severely limited. 33 Some commentators have argued that in contrast to UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone actively sought to undermine the establishment of the RUFP, obstructing the process in favour of pursuing a total military eradication of the RUF. 34 Nevertheless, even if active governmental support had been clearly provided, the unsuitability of the RUF for political transformation remained a major obstacle to its achievement. The damaging effect RUF leaders had upon the political integration of the rank and file further showed that the dismantling of the group, rather than its political consolidation, would be of greater benefit to the peacebuilding project.
Political Reintegration: Beyond the RUF Party
The RUF's inability to reinvent itself as a political party did not mean that the political reintegration of its combatants had failed -but rather the opposite. In the immediate post-conflict environment, ex-combatants found that they were able to pursue their concerns through established political parties and the wider institutions of Sierra Leonean civil society without recourse to their RUF identity. That the RUF failed to secure a single seat in the 2002 elections was not only testament to the unsuitability of the RUF for political transformation but also a sign that civil society had, to some extent, successfully undertaken the role of voicing and addressing the concerns of ex-combatants. Nevertheless, despite this apparent progress, ex-combatant's interaction with civil society groups and political bodies has not been linked to an associated investment of confidence in domestic institutions, but rather stems from a trust in the capacity of outside actors.
An institution which played a key role in recognising the political, social and economic disengagement which had motivated many RUF combatants was the the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 35 Crucially, its 2004 statement on the causes of the conflict acknowledged the part of previous administrations in rendering Sierra Leone vulnerable to conflict through political abuses and mismanagement. 36 This recognition in itself assisted the political reintegration of the RUF, not only by facilitating reconciliation and understanding between victims and perpetrators, but also by signalling that addressing RUF political grievances was deemed integral to the formation of a more equitable Sierra Leonean political landscape. The TRC's final statement was also highly significant for the political reintegration of the RUF in its attempt to move beyond a simple recognition of these legitimate issues towards the formation of government policy designed to incorporate them in the national project of peacebuilding. Of pressing concern to the TRC was tackling the "youth question", which it viewed as central to the disengagement of RUF combatants and as representing a "national emergency that demands national mobilisation". 37 The TRC recognised the devastation caused during the conflict by the "lethal cocktail of youth marginalisation and political manipulation", and noted with alarm that youth continued to "languish in a twilight zone of unemployment and despair." Ex-combatants have faith more in outsiders than in their own government. The experience with UNAMSIL has been a positive one, but ex-combatants see appeals to the international community and to NGOs as the best ways to hold their government accountable and to achieve positive results. 43 If former fighters of the RUF are relying on the presence and work of international organisations to guarantee their political stake in society, the political activity of many ex-combatants may not have truly assisted their integration into Sierra Leone's political system, but rather the opposite.
This problem is exacerbated by continued widespread cynicism of ex-combatants towards homegrown politicians and institutions, which has strengthened the prevailing belief that Sierra
Leone's future depends entirely on international intervention and regulation. 44 In a country severely lacking state capacity even prior to the conflict, the strong presence and footprint of NGOs and international organisations is perhaps to be expected, but nevertheless, the long-term Common Ground, taken in the run-up to the elections, found that most respondents maintained little or no trust in national politicians and felt that political protest against unjust legislation would do little to change government policy. 46 This failure to establish trust among ex-RUF combatants in Sierra Leone's own political institutions is linked to insufficient progress on two key fronts; the fight against corruption, and tackling Sierra Leone's economic underdevelopment.
Building Confidence: Corruption
Despite voting in large numbers in successive national elections, ex-combatants still feel that corruption and patrimonial politics continue largely unabated. 47 This perception can be traced to post-conflict instances of corruption and abuse in public political institutions. In the run-up to the three of its five commissioners were indicted by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), the body established to instil faith in public institutions by rooting out such malpractice. 48 In 2004, the NEC Chairman resigned from office, claiming that the ruling SLPP party had sought to tamper with the results of local elections (the NEC also expressed concern over voting irregularities the following year). In 2004, the ICG lamented the lack of commitment by the government in countering corruption, citing the case of Momoh Pujeh, a former Minster of Transport whose conviction for unlawful possession of precious materials was overturned on particularly tenuous grounds. 49 Indeed, in some respects, the government appeared to actively hinder the work of the ACC; delays in processing cases by the Attorney-General's Office consistently slowed prosecutions, and President Kabbah openly condemned the ACC for focussing on the prosecution of government ministers. In 2007, the ICG described the ACC as "virtually moribund", accusing it of "sending the wrong message about endemic corruption". 50 Alongside these political abuses, ex-combatants were also dismayed by the reappearance, postconflict, of local and national elites that had dominated Sierra Leone prior to the outbreak of hostilities and represented the inequitable pre-conflict system of patrimony. 51 A pertinent example was the restoration of traditional Paramount Chiefs to positions of authority in the local system of government. Enacted immediately after the war and heavily funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the move was regarded as an effective means to secure the regional control and stability necessary for post-conflict reconstruction. This "attempt to restore the past", as President Kabbah described it, was severely criticised for reinforcing the notion of "same car, different driver". 52 In a subsequent DfID-sponsored evaluation, it became clear that rural youths in particular resented the restoration of Paramount Chiefs, whom they deemed responsible for imposing unfair and exclusionary private jurisprudence, precisely the grievance that had prompted so many youths to join the RUF. 53 Consequently, although the move initially appeared to hold value for political integration by establishing local political authority, it actually risked undermining this very same objective by restoring socio-political divisions.
Notwithstanding the criticisms aimed at government institutions and public bodies, it is arguable that progress has undeniably been made, particularly given the challenges faced and the long history of endemic corruption in Sierra Leone. An example is the NEC, which in spite of many obstacles has been relatively successful in battling electoral fraud, particularly in its handling of the 2007 elections -for which it took sole responsibility. Nevertheless, such progress may be insufficient to restore ex-combatants' faith in Sierra Leone's political system. In a 2005 report on the battle against corruption, the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) concluded that "most Sierra Leoneans are convinced that corruption is on the increase", confirming that many remained "pessimistic about the Commission's mission to eradicate corruption in the country". 54 Following the 2007 elections, an internal government investigation found that corruption had indeed been rife under the previous regime of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Such corruption, both in its day-to-day effect on Sierra Leoneans and in its impact on perceptions, has deepened excombatants' cynicism towards the political establishment, entrenching their political disengagement Building Confidence: the Economy Sierra Leone's long-term ability to incorporate ex-combatants politically remains intimately linked to its ability to incorporate them economically, a factor that has proven far more critical to an ex-RUF fighter's renunciation of violence than any political incentive. Failure in this area has led to a failure in tackling corruption and meeting the expectations of demobilised RUF combatants. 55 In terms of the number of combatants processed and the apparent consolidation of peace following its eventual completion, the DDR programme is widely regarded as a success. 56 Nevertheless, the reintegration project in Sierra Leone has encountered severe difficulties, not only in securing funding and long-term commitments, but also with the overall desperate condition of Sierra Leone's economy into which demobilised combatants are expected to return.
In 2006, the UN estimated that 70% of Sierra Leone's population continued to live below the poverty line, with the concentration of poverty the highest in rural areas away from Freetown, the very areas in which the RUF had previously prospered from economic and political discontent. 57 In 2007, the UN warned of Sierra Leone's "severe financial crisis", with the ICG also noting that youth unemployment had reached an all time high of 80%. 58 Significantly, according to a report of the Peace Building Commission, the effects of poverty have been felt most acutely by Sierra Leone's youth, a demographic that includes many former RUF combatants:
Two thirds of the youth population is unemployed and largely marginalized from the political system, and lacks adequate education and training. Significantly, many of the dire conditions that gave rise to the conflict in 1991 remain in 2006, with many youths unemployed, marginalized and lacking hope for the future. 59 This bleak assessment echoes that of the TRC in its 2004 final report, where it found that excombatant's political integration was being undermined by the continued desperation of their social and economic destitution, stating: "many ex-combatants testified that the conditions that caused them to join the conflict persist in the country, and if given the opportunity, they would fight again". 60 Accordingly, following DDR, many former RUF combatants have returned to the fringes of Sierra Leone, both geographically and socio-politically, rejoining the growing number of youths seeking profit from alluvial diamond mining in the border regions or taking their place among the swollen ranks of the towns' unemployed. 61 This represents a worrying echo of the pre- former combatants would almost certainly result in their return to violence as a means to securing basic welfare security. 62 In some instances, ex-RUF combatants have indeed returned to conflict rather than seek to navigate the complex psychological and economic difficulties encountered in peacetime. For many whose driving motivation has been to seek economic security, integration into regional conflicts such as that in neighbouring Liberia has made far more sense than seeking political reintegration into an impoverished Sierra Leone. 63 The apparently profitable involvement of ex-combatants in regional conflicts -or at least reports suggesting such activity -risks encouraging former RUF fighters still in Sierra Leone to revaluate the benefits of peace.
The 2007 Elections
The rural location and distance from the hub of Freetown, the use of radio broadcasts was a crucial development. 64 The promotion of youth issues to the heart of political campaigning may also have played a part in the high turn-out, with the major parties presenting themselves as actively seeking to resolve the problems causing discontent among Sierra Leone's youth and excombatants. Presidential candidates focused heavily on youth employment, the provision of education and the eradication of corruption, promising at youth rallies that such issues would be the central preoccupation of their presidency. 65 The increasingly youth-centred focus of the parties owed much to the fact that of the 2.6 million Sierra Leoneans registered to vote, almost 40% were under the age of 27.
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Despite the political rhetoric aimed at capturing the youth vote, a 2007 survey conducted prior to the polls found that many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, saw the political parties as unrepresentative and as offering little real policy choice. 67 In this sense, the votes of former RUF fighters related more to a desire for change than an investment in one particular party or political strategy deemed to correspond to their interests. 68 Nevertheless, in a country where such dissatisfaction had previously been expressed through violence and a rejection of political authority, the use of the vote by ex-combatants in this manner was deemed a positive sign for the political reintegration project. Optimism also stemmed from the country's ability to survive a number of potentially destabilising factors in the run-up to and during the elections, such as the delay of voting by two weeks, the close nature of the contest and, crucially, spates of violence in the lead-up to the second round of voting, which at one point threatened to derail voting
altogether.
Yet while encouraging in many respects, the high voter turn-out and completion of the elections were not tantamount to successful political reintegration. In actual fact, the 2007 elections highlighted the growth of a number of developments which served to undermine the political reintegration of former RUF combatants. Perhaps most critically, they showed that even where ex-combatants had been politically incorporated, some forms of political participation actually proved divisive or detrimental to their long-term political reintegration.
The violence in the second round of voting provides a potent illustration of this point and of the need to examine the specific form of political participation achieved among former rebels.
Following the failure of any candidate to secure the required 55% of the vote, tensions between supporters of all sides greatly intensified and street rallies turned violent. Police were forced to use tear gas to disperse battling APC and SLPP supporters across the country, moving President
Kabbah to threaten to impose a state of emergency to curb what he described as "the current state of intimidation, molestation and violent acts". 69 Tensions on the streets were matched by tensions between the contending candidates, and amid increasing claims and counter-claims of political intimidation, President Kabbah was unable to gain the attendance of both the SLPP's Solomon
Berewa and the APC's Ernest Koroma at a public rally to denounce the civil unrest. 70 Despite this setback, the second round of voting was successfully completed and the APC emerged victorious.
Having failed to win a court injunction barring the NEC from announcing the results on 17
September, the defeated SLPP duly conducted a peaceful transition of power. However, looters subsequently ransacked the headquarters of the SLPP and in Mile 91, a base for a large number of ex-RUF combatants, many violent attacks against journalists and SLPP supporters were reported.
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Some observers interpreted the tensions of the second round of voting as a positive sign for the health of democratic development in Sierra Leone. 72 It is certainly clear that the closeness of the vote forced the major parties to court the electorate, increasing the likelihood that policies would incorporate ex-combatants' concerns and that ex-combatants would themselves see their votes as having a direct effect on the political landscape. The split of Charles Margai from the SLPP to form the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), which arguably cost Solomon Berewa the election, was widely deemed a positive development for democracy in Sierra Leone in that it limited the chances of a landslide victory for the incumbent regime, consequently increasing accountability and reliance on public support by the new government. 73 Nevertheless, if the aim of politically integrating former RUF combatants was to consolidate their move away from violence towards peaceful political intercourse as a means to bring change, the violence was far from positive. An immediate concern was the direct involvement of ex-RUF combatants, with all sides accused of using former rebel and CDF soldiers to intimidate opposition supporters and candidates. In an interview with IRIN, the director of PRIDE, Ibrahim Bangura, confirmed the recruitment of ex-RUF combatants by political parties as bodyguards and security, noting that the head of the APC's security operations was ex-RUF fighter Idrissa Kamara. 74 The cynical The election violence also reflected the wider development of a negative political culture that did little to build confidence in the capacity of post-conflict Sierra Leone to transcend the abuses that had originally fostered conflict. In the run-up to elections, the UN Peacebuilding Commission observed that "the discourse from political parties is showing signs of growing intolerance and parties are still striving to become credible vehicles for political expression." 75 The dangerous promotion of violence as a political method went hand in hand with party politics adopting a more confrontational tone, culminating in President Kabbah's injunction that contending parties "desist from making provocative and inflammatory statements against each other" during the election. 76 The system into which the RUF was being incorporated was increasingly based on zero-sum political competition, with the danger that ex-combatants invested in particular parties over and above the system as a whole. 77 In the long-term, the development of such a political atmosphere risks seeing ex-combatants reject the authority of those leaders or parties for whom they did not vote and encourage them to view any political failure of their party or leader as a defeat of their own aspirations and political stake. boycotted by the SLPP executive, the government was forced to rely on borrowed limousines and UN helicopters to transport its dignitaries. 87 At the focal point of one of Sierra Leone's most encouraging signs for the consolidation of peace, the economic strictures which threaten to undermine it were as apparent as ever.
Conclusion
The case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that the nature of a non-state armed group and the identity and motivations of its members directly affect the form and relative ease of its political reintegration. In the case of the RUF, the overall absence of a coherent political project, a limited technical political capacity and the movement's deep unpopularity with the civilian population rendered it wholly unsuited for transformation into a political party. The importance of economic drivers for conflict and the large-scale perpetration of atrocities also undermined political incentives for peace, particularly when compared to appeals based on the provision of amnesty, basic welfare and security. In this respect, the political integration project in Sierra Leone also shows that offers of political power to a non-state armed actor must be informed by an understanding of the motivations of both its leadership and rank-and-file combatants, which are likely to differ widely. In Sierra Leone, the relationship of RUF leaders to their combatants was such that it served to undermine rather than facilitate their political reintegration. Hence another implication for political integration projects, which may run counter to conventional approaches, is that the dismantling rather than the political formalisation of a non-state armed actor may in fact best serve its political integration. Finally, the Sierra Leone experience shows that decisive military force applied against spoiler elements in a leadership can serve to facilitate combatants' involvement in DDR and wider political re-engagement.
The RUF's unsuitability for conventional political incorporation demonstrated that the success of political integration cannot be judged solely by a group's ability to form a party or share power.
Instead, a more holistic account is necessary to appreciate the extent to which ex-combatants locate opportunities for expression and resolution of political concerns through a wide variety of formal and informal means, be it through participation in civil society groups, public discussion or interaction with established political institutions. Likewise, the Sierra Leone case shows that the success of this wider process cannot be judged by the narrow terms of electoral participation or the absence of renewed conflict, but must include less tangible indicators such as the extent to which ex-combatants hold faith in political interaction to deliver results, and the foundations upon which such confidence is based. Directly related to this approach, the experience of the RUF demonstrates that not only does the nature and identity of non-state armed actors impact on the form and potential success of political reintegration, but so too does the nature and configuration of the political system into which they are being incorporated. In the case of Sierra Leone, the involvement of international actors in politically incorporating ex-combatants was often positive and needed, but did it result in the RUF investing in external actors and assistance as opposed to Sierra Leone's own institutions? Similarly, the nature of Sierra Leone's political system, as highlighted by the 2007 elections, in many instances served to erode ex-combatants' confidence in political intercourse, or to reinforce violence as an acceptable method to achieve change. Finally, underpinning all of these factors, Sierra Leone's continuing experience demonstrates that for a group such as the RUF, political and economic reintegration are two sides of the same coin. 88 For combatants whose primary agenda in conflict was to secure basic economic and welfare security, their long-term commitment to peaceful political interaction over and above violence is predicated upon successful economic incorporation. Given Sierra Leone's severe underdevelopment, and that of many societies emerging from violent conflict, progress in this respect represents one of the greatest challenges for the political reintegration of non-state armed groups.
1 President Charles Taylor of Liberia resented Sierra Leone's support for ECOMOG (Economic Community of West Africa States Monitoring Group) troops operating against his forces in Liberia. The RUF were actively sponsored by Taylor, who in seeking to destabilise the country, also gained access to its extensive diamond deposits. In contrast to this article, Richards & Vincent, "Sierra Leone: Marginalization of the RUF," p88, argue that the RUF did develop "a quite coherent political agenda". However, although political grievances certainly existed, and apparent political instruction of some recruits occurred, the multitude of agendas at all levels which superseded political aims resulted in a clear lack of political and organisational coherence.
5
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